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Abstract
Minimum Parking Requirements (MPRs) are almost universal in U.S. cities and common in the rest of
the world. In the U.S., parking requirements for commercial buildings commonly require 700 ft2 of parking
for each 1000 ft2 of floor space. To the extent this is a binding requirement, MPRs could result in distortion
in commercial development. MPRs require either the allocation of land for parking, or very costly
substitution of structured parking for land. Therefore, MPR distortions are likely to increase with the value
of land. A steep gradient in the cost of the MPRs leads to the possibility that MPR costs could be high
enough to change where developers find it profitable to locate commercial development. In particular,
MPR costs may be high enough in dense, high land-value areas to discourage development or move it to
outlying areas. We use a Mixed Geographically Weighted Regression (MGWR) approach to estimate a
hedonic specification using sales of office properties in Los Angeles County. This approach allows local
variation in the estimates of marginal values of key parameters, including the value of on-site parking. To
control for unobservables, we use the Linn (2013) method to incorporate pre-period prices into the MGWR
estimator. Then we use these hedonic estimates plus locally-specific estimates of parking costs to estimate
the cost of MPRs on a property by property basis. We check the robustness of the results by comparing our
estimated costs to the in-lieu-of-parking fees that are offered by some of the cities in our sample. Our
estimates of MPR costs are close to these market values for escaping the parking requirement. Our results
show a significant gradient in MPR costs. Smaller properties in dense, high land value areas in Los Angeles
can have MPR costs that amount to about 30% of building construction costs while properties in outlying
areas often do not have binding MPRS. This gradient is likely to be sufficient to move development from
high land value, dense, city centers into lower value areas. Our suite of methods could be applied to other
building and zoning regulation, such as height regulation and inclusionary housing where the cost gradient
is also likely to be important.
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1. Introduction
Most cities across the globe have parking standards (also called minimum parking
requirements (MPRs) or parking minimums) for residential and nonresidential buildings which
require developers to provide a minimum amount of off-street parking. Parking minimums are
typically spatially invariant, related to the land-use type and generally set based on historical
patterns of the relationship between key land use types and auto travel to those land uses.
The goal of MPRs is to ensure adequate parking at a low price to limit local congestion and to
stimulate local business (Shoup, 1999a). Yet, critics of MPRs (Shoup 1999a, 2005, 2018;
Willson,1995) state that at a minimum these standards create parking oversupply which decreases
the cost (direct and time) of parking, encouraging more automobile trips (Shoup 1999a, 2005;
Shoup and Pickrell,1978). The more expansive critique is that MPRs, if binding, force developers
to devote more land to parking than their profit-maximizing decision and make development in
areas where land has a high value much more expensive and less profitable (Willson, 1995, Cutter
and Franco 2012). As a result, critics suggest that MPRs influence the location of new development
and contribute to the sprawling of impervious parking surfaces at the expense of the environment
(Feitelson and Rotem, 2004) and urban design (Mukhija and Shoup, 2006).1
Therefore, coalitions of parking reform-makers have been challenging MPRs in cities around
the world, from Auckland to Berlin and from Mexico City to Seattle, Portland or even Los Angeles.
While many European cities are ahead of the United States (U.S.) on this trend to reform parking
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Critics also invoke equity issues as the costs of providing parking are incorporated into the price of other goods
purchased by a variety of consumers who may not have used those parking spaces.
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minimums, parking reform is still catching up in the U.S. as many cities are still leaving their
parking standards untouched (Franco 2020).2
This paper uses geographically weighted regression, combined with a variety of identification
strategies, to identify the cost-gradient for this building regulation. Our strategy could nevertheless
be extended to a variety of land use and other types of regulations that target a continuous landuse variable, such as height restrictions, inclusionary housing, minimum lot size and open-space
requirements. City officials typically argue that these regulations are necessary to relieve
congestion, provide open space, improve urban health, or make a city “beautiful.” But if this is the
case, what is the “right” regulation that best balances the trade-offs? For instance, inclusionary
zoning (IZ) is another controversial building regulatory example with similar criticisms to MPRs.
IZ is an affordable housing tool that links the production of affordable housing to the production
of market-rate housing.3 Opponents of this regulation, particularly mandatory ones, argue that the
additional costs imposed on developers will raise the price of market-rate housing (ultimately
reducing rather than increasing affordability) and reduce the housing supply (Ellickson, 1981;
Emrath, 2006). Moreover, it is also argued that developers will move to other areas where
development is more profitable and as such, it is an incentive that could lead to urban sprawl
(Pendall, 2008). FAR limits are also thought to reduce housing supply, raise prices and lead to
longer commutes (Bertaud and Brueckner, 2005; Brueckner and Singh, 2020).
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Amsterdam, Berlin, Copenhagen, Hamburg and Paris have reduced or eliminated parking requirements over the last
15 years. Progressive land-use reforms are nevertheless also taking root in the city of Los Angeles and in other
American cities. Cities like Lancaster, Santa Monica, San Diego, San Francisco, Houston and Cincinnati have already
eliminated parking requirements – either citywide or for central districts. And in the case of Los Angeles, since 2014,
the L.A. City Planning Department has been working on a city community plan update, called DTLA 2040, which
approved would eliminate MPRs for all of downtown Los Angeles.
3
A 2016 survey found that 886 jurisdictions in 25 states in the United States and the District of Columbia have
inclusionary zoning programs, although nearly 90 percent of them were in New Jersey, Massachusetts, and California
(Thaden and Wang 2017). Inclusionary zoning also exists in European countries (e.g. UK, Spain, the Netherlands and
Italy). While in the US the drive for IZ began in the 1970s, European countries started to work with this tool about 25
years ago.
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Given the extent of the controversy around land use regulations such as FAR limits, MPRs and
IZ, it is important to fully understand and quantify how their stringency varies across location and
their spatial economic effects on land values and real estate development. Such a knowledge will
enable policy makers to better spatially tailor these policy tools to make them more effective and
to use the necessary development incentives to mitigate or offset their costs which, if excessive,
can discourage development projects or lead to inefficient private decisions regarding the size and
where to locate such projects. In addition, effective building policies can also mitigate existing
residential and economic inequalities due to racial, economic and development segregation.
In the case of MPRs, which is the focus of our paper, there are two critical assumptions behind
the criticisms. MPRs critics suggests that the cost of MPRs is far greater in dense, high-value urban
areas than in the low-value areas, because parking either consumes land or requires costly parking
structures, that is, they assume an MPR cost-gradient. However, this intuition neglects how
congestion and customer demand in dense, high-value areas may influence the value of parking.
Also, technological options such as structured parking may blunt the cost differences of MPRs
between low and high land-value areas. The current literature does not contain, to our knowledge,
an empirical analysis of the MPR policy cost gradient, and this gradient is key to the more
expansive critique of MPRs. Second, these critiques assume that MPRs have a large net private
cost, that is, that they strongly bind the private developer. The current literature does not examine
for what types of properties and geographic areas this assumption is true.
Shoup (1999a, 2005) and Willson (1995) provide case studies where there is reason to believe
that parking requirements have forced developers to place more parking than they would in the
absence of this regulation. To our knowledge the only broad-based empirical evidence in the
literature on the strength of the effect of MPRs on off-street parking supply is Cutter and Franco
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(2012). Using a hedonic approach, the authors found that MPRs bind in several non-residential
property segments. However, Cutter and Franco (2012) use global OLS and spatial hedonic
methods that cannot capture geographic non-stationarity in the coefficients of the hedonic property
value regressions. Sunding and Swoboda, (2010) as well as Redfearn (2009) show the importance
of the location and existence of local “micro-markets” in real estate using the same GWR methods
used in this paper. That GWR method allows us to avoid possible Simpson’s paradox type bias in
global estimates of the cost of MPRs.
Dense, high-value areas (which Shoup (2005) typically uses to demonstrate the high cost of
MPRs) often have more structured parking (above or underground) than sprawling suburbs.
Structured parking is far more expensive than surface parking, and underground parking more
expensive than surface (Franco 2016). This implies that one of the key decisions to model when
examining the impact of MPRs is the choice of parking type. Brueckner and Franco (2017) use a
two-zone spatial theoretical analysis of residential parking, focusing on the choice among different
parking technologies (surface, structural and underground) and on the effect of MPRs on
residential parking supply. Here, we develop a theoretical model that shows how non-residential
developers will switch from surface to structured parking as land costs increase and how a binding
parking constraint implies a wedge between the marginal value and construction cost of parking.
Our theoretical results further reveal the critical necessity of including the construction cost of the
type of parking used on a property in the analysis, and also including properties with structured
parking in the empirical data.
Analyzing the two critical assumptions mentioned earlier requires a geographicallydifferentiated approach. We use a hedonic approach with a sample of 2,616 office property sales
across Los Angeles County to examine these two key assumptions. This paper proceeds with such
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analysis by: (1) using a mixed geographically weighted regression (MGWR) approach that
estimates how the local values of land and parking vary across the geography of Los Angeles
County, and; (2) estimating location specific construction costs for surface, above and belowground structured parking. Combining these two approaches allows us to estimate the wedge
between parking construction cost and value. That is, we estimate a spatially varying property
specific net private cost of MPRs. Our theoretical model shows that this wedge is positively and
monotonically related to the implicit tax on density imposed by MPRs.
Then, we examine whether the geographic distribution of the gap between the value and full
cost of parking corresponds to the analytical assumptions of the critics of MPRs. First, we examine
the extent to which this cost gap is large, comparing it to the cost of floor space. Then, we examine
whether there is a large difference between MPR costs in dense, high-value areas compared to
lower land-value areas. For completeness, we also explore (1) which factors are correlated with
the regulatory cost of MPRs including the size of the parcel and the value of the land, and (2) how
in-lieu parking fees compare to our measure of the private shadow cost of MPRs. 4 In-lieu parking
fees offer developers the option of paying a fee in lieu of providing the required parking. Our
theoretical results further show that in-lieu fees can be used to proxy developers’ cost with building
regulations. Therefore, these fees in a per square foot of building area may also reveal the implicit
impact fees in the MPRs. It should nevertheless be noted that our paper does not examine the full
social welfare net cost of MPRs, but knowing the magnitude of developers´ MPR costs will shed
light on whether they are likely to outweigh the policy congestion benefits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and
constructs the indirect measure of the extent of the minimum parking requirement constraint,
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Shoup (1999b) shows that several cities in United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, South Africa, and
Iceland all have in-lieu parking fees for office buildings in CBDs.
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which we then test empirically. Section 3 develops the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes our
data and variables. Section 5 compares the Global OLS and MGWR hedonic regressions. Section
6 describes our methodology for calculating the marginal value of land and parking, and then
presents our simulation results on the net costs of MPRs. Section 7 implements several robustness
tests of our findings.

2. The Theoretical Setup
The cost of regulation may be measured in different ways. For instance, Cheshire and Hilber
(2008) build on the implicit tax of regulation developed by Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) and
estimate costs of planning constraints (such as height restrictions) in British office markets by
comparing the price of an additional floor to the cost of constructing it. 5 Another example is the
Sunding and Swoboda (2010) study. In contrast to the previous study, Sunding and Swoboda
(2010) focus on the residential market in the Inland Empire of Southern California and develop a
condition, referred as “regulatory rationing”, to measure the shadow price of regulatory constraints
on the allowable number of housing units. This shadow price of housing regulation is measured
through a wedge between the price of housing and the value of the structure and land. Recently,
Brueckner et al. (2017) develop a new approach for measuring the stringency of building height
restrictions, and apply it to a data set of land-lease transactions from China. This new approach
implies that relaxation of a Floor-to-Area (FAR) restriction increases the land price, and that the
elasticity of land price with respect to FAR is an indicator of the stringency of the restriction.

5

This study finds that regulatory costs differ vastly across markets and over time, with the highest regulatory costs
being observed in the Greater London Area and with the time trend being positive in most markets. These findings
provide important insights; however, the study does not consider the regulatory cost imposed on housing and the
sample does not include more rural local planning authorities.
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We follow closely the definition of the shadow price of regulation used by Sunding and
Swoboda (2010) while focusing on the non-residential market. Here we provide and interpret key
equations of a representative non-residential developer’ problem and we discuss how the shadow
cost of parking standards for properties with surface or structured parking can be measured.

Model Assumptions
Suppose that the office-space bid rent in a given location is represented by:

B = f ( N , A)

(1)

where B is the office rent per square foot of floor space, N is total parking spaces and A is a
vector of locational amenities, including distance to the CBD, that affect the attractiveness of the
site. We assume that (1) is concave in its arguments. Parking can be either surface or underground.6
Surface parking refers to lots directly on land and underground parking consists of structured
parking under multi-story buildings. Total parking is represented by:
N = N s + Nu

(2)

where N s is the number of surface parking spaces and N u is the number of underground parking
spaces.
Office floor space is produced with a strictly concave, constant-returns production function,

H = f ( K , L) , where K is capital or non-land inputs used to produce office floor space and L
represents the acres of land physically covered by K , which we denote as covered land.

6

Aboveground structured parking is an intermediate case between underground and surface parking. It has lower costs
than underground but higher land use. Restricting ourselves to the two extreme cases allows us to present the key
findings of the model without unnecessary complexity.
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Let h(S ) be the intensive form of the production function. It denotes square feet of office floor
space per acre as a function of structural density S , which equals capital per acre of covered land.
We further assume that h satisfies h  0 and h //  0 and that L is fixed and set to 1.
Parking costs differ depending on the type of parking provided. Total costs for surface parking
are the sum of construction costs and land costs:
Cs ( N s ) = N s ( pk K + pl l )

(3)

where pl and p k are the prices per acre of land and for capital, K is the fixed amount of capital
per surface parking space and l is the fixed amount of land per surface parking space.
We assume that no additional land is necessary for underground parking since it will be built
below the building. Thus, total costs for underground parking reflect mainly its construction costs:
Cu ( Nu , S ) = pk KNu + pk K ( Nu , S )

(4)

where K ( N u , S ) is the capital cost requirement per underground parking space and is assumed to
be a convex function.7
There is a MPR expressed as number of parking spaces per square feet of gross floor space:
𝑁 ≥ 𝑎𝐿ℎ(𝑆)

(5)

with 0  a  1 a parameter set by the city government.8

7

As more underground parking is added more units of capital are necessary to fortify the building structure and to
provide vertical-transportation requirements.
8
Note that H(K,L)=Lh(S). Since H(K,L) is concave and homogenous of degree one, it follows that H(K/L,1)= h(S).
Also, the value of a can be lower, equal or higher than the value of a that would exist in an unconstrained market.
However, for the purpose of exploring the effects of minimum parking requirements we consider the case where a is
such that the constraint is always binding and thus, affects the market equilibrium. If for example, a =1/200sft, it
means that developers are required to provide one parking space for each 200sft of gross floor area.
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Type of parking provided
The developer determines which type of parking will be provided based on the marginal cost.
The private marginal cost per underground parking space is given by

K ( Nu , S ) 
pk  K +
.
Nu 


(7)

The first component of (7) is the marginal cost for the additional underground parking space,
which is the same for all parking spaces in the structure. The second component of (7) is the inframarginal cost associated with the additional underground space.
On the other hand, the private marginal cost per surface parking space is given by
pk K + pl l .

(8)

The first component of (8) is the marginal cost for the additional surface parking space and the
second component is the marginal cost of land.
Comparing (7) and (8), the marginal cost of underground parking is greater than the marginal
cost of surface parking if the cost of land is small relative to the degree of diminishing marginal
returns:
pk

K ( Nu , S )
 pl l .
N u

(9)

According to (9) developers switch to structured parking if the cost of land is high relative to
the cost of parking construction. Typically, this result, and the analysis provided by Brueckner and
Franco (2017), suggest that Central Business District (CBD) developers provide underground
parking, since land is very expensive in CBD areas, and suburban developers provide surface
parking. But this depends crucially on the cost of structured parking.
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2.1. The Shadow Cost of MPRs in CBDs
Parking requirements are mostly criticized because they force developers to provide more
parking than they would supply voluntarily and to provide parking spaces that lose money. Since
this is the interesting case, we restrict the discussion to that case in this section.
The developer’s problem in the CBD is to choose structural density and underground parking
spaces that maximize profit per acre of covered land taking into account the MPR constraint:9
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐵(𝑁𝑢 , 𝐴)ℎ(𝑆) − 𝑝𝑘 𝑆 − 𝑝𝑙 − 𝑝𝑘 (𝑁𝑢 𝐾̄ + 𝐾(𝑁𝑢 , 𝑆))
𝑁𝑢 ,𝑆

s.t. 𝑁𝑢 ≥ 𝑎ℎ(𝑆)

(10)

In this regulated equilibrium (with binding MPRs), the following conditions must be satisfied:
N u = ah (S )

(11)

𝜕𝐾(𝑁 ,𝑆)
𝜕𝐵(𝑁 ,𝐴)
𝑝𝑘 (𝐾̄ + 𝜕𝑁𝑢 ) − 𝜕𝑁𝑢 ℎ(𝑆) = 𝜆 > 0
𝑢

𝐵(𝑁𝑢 , 𝐴)

𝜕ℎ(𝑆)
𝜕𝑆

(12)

𝑢

= 𝑝𝑘 (1 +

𝜕𝐾(𝑁𝑢 ,𝑆)
𝜕𝑆

) + 𝜆𝑎

𝜕ℎ(𝑆)
𝜕𝑆

(13)

with 𝜆 the shadow price of the binding parking constraint. Condition (11) reveals that the
regulation imposes a binding minimum number of parking spaces per square feet of office floor
space and that a developer will supply this minimum amount (but not more).
Condition (12) states that the marginal cost of parking will be above the marginal value of that
parking to the property. This inequality follows because the parking requirement binds (𝜆 > 0),
with N u restricted above its optimal private value suggesting developers supply more spaces that
their private optimal decision. This inequality condition can be tested to measure the shadow cost

Note that (10) implies that total floor space and parking space are “bundled” and rented as a package to the tenants
of a building. For example, in nearly all buildings in Los Angeles today, parking is included in the price or rent of the
unit. Tenants do not have the option of “unbundling” the cost of parking from their purchase or rent. The main
exception is in the Downtown area where some buildings do not include parking in their rental rates.
9
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of such regulation in downtown areas. The more stringent (and thereby costly) the parking
standard, the larger the wedge represented in (12).
Condition (13) reveals that parking requirements also cause problems in the office floor space
market. The wedge defined by (12) affects the optimal condition of office density (13) through 𝜆.
When MPRs bind, the excess parking results in a deficit for the developer of a new building. This
induced deficit constitutes an indirect cost on building square footage (𝜆𝑎

𝜕ℎ(𝑆)
𝜕𝑆

), which is again

proportional to the wedge in (12). This, in turn, creates a disincentive to high-density development
because it imposes an extra wedge between the marginal revenue gain from additional building
square footage and marginal construction costs.10
Finally, it is possible to illustrate how the cost of complying with default parking requirements
may increase the total cost of constructing, for example, ℎ(𝑆) square feet of an office building with
underground garage. Assume that each parking space takes up 𝑙̄ sqft of parking area, 𝑎 are the
required parking spaces per ℎ(𝑆) sqft of building area and the MPR cost per sqft is 𝜆/𝑙̄ . Then,
every foot of building office space is mandated to have 𝑎 𝑙̄ feet of parking. At this ratio, this implies a cost
increase in building development costs of 𝜆𝑎 per sqft.

2.2. The Shadow Cost of MPRs in Suburban Areas
The developer’s problem in the suburbs is similar to the one described for CBD sites:
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐵(𝑁𝑆 , 𝐴)ℎ(𝑆) − 𝑝𝑘 𝑆 − 𝑝𝑙 − 𝑁𝑠 (𝑝𝑙 𝑙̄ + 𝑝𝑘 𝐾̄ )
𝑁𝑆 ,𝑆

s.t. 𝑁𝑆 ≥ 𝑎ℎ(𝑆)
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(14)

Like MPRs, FAR limits are also established in a sort of ad-hoc way, often based on what regulators think it is
appropriate, or are politically salable, and are not tied to any economic analysis that weighs the costs and benefits of
restrictions. Our gap between the price per square foot of building area and the construction cost per square foot
approach could also be applied to examine the stringency of FAR limits. In an unregulated market, this gap or
regulatory tax should be absent, and its existence would then imply that a FAR limit is constraining building heights.
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Again  represents the shadow cost associated with the binding MPR constraint. All the
optimal conditions in this case are similar to those described by (11)-(13). Like in downtown areas,
binding MPRs enforce an oversupply of parking in suburban areas. In the suburbs, the shadow cost
of this regulation can also be measured through the following wedge:
𝜕𝐵(𝑁 ,𝐴)
𝑝𝑙 𝑙̄ + 𝑝𝑘 𝐾̄ − 𝜕𝑁𝑠 ℎ(𝑆) = 𝜆 > 0.

(15)

𝑠

Condition (15) is similar to (12), if parking constraints bind, then the marginal cost of parking
will exceed its value. Note that because of (9), if developers choose underground parking, and the
marginal value of parking is the same, the wedge between parking value and its cost will be greater
in the property with underground parking or in CBD areas where the compliance is mostly done
with underground parking.
Non-residential properties are likely to differ in both their parking requirements “a”, since “a”
is set by the city based on the use of building, and their marginal value of parking.11 Moreover, as
seen in (3) and (4) the cost per parking space includes land and construction costs and can differ
across parking designs (underground versus surface lots). Land costs, input materials (capital and
labor) as well as geologic conditions can also vary across settings (urban/suburban), geographic
areas, and location within a particular city. Land costs in urban centers are generally much higher
than in suburban areas. Also, while geologic conditions vary across regions, developers have a
greater choice of sites when considering development in suburban and rural areas. In central
locations, sites are scarcer and soil with geologic constraints may be more difficult to avoid. Our
theory underlines the importance of looking at marginal values and costs for a specific location
when assessing the shadow cost of parking requirements.

11

For example, the city of Los Angeles requires that restaurants and coffee shops provide 1 parking space per 100
sq.ft and commercial or business office uses to provide 1 parking space per 500 sq.ft.
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Finally, one can argue that because developers do not take into account the external benefits
(e.g. reduction of street congestion) of supplying on-site parking when making their development
decisions, they undersupply on-site parking spaces. Therefore, proponents of a MPR argue that
such a land use regulation would correct for such an externality by forcing developers to supply
the “optimal social” amount. Theoretically, it is conceivable that these locally-constructed
regulations have worked out as a system that functions like a Pigouvian tax internalizing the
offsetting parking externalities of new construction. Yet, such a view seems debatable. Getting the
right local policy requires that these minimum standards be set based on local characteristics (e.g.
existence of public transit and off-site parking supply), local demand and on whether they may
induce more building elsewhere. Very few localities actually take these features into account when
setting their parking minimums. As such, critics argue that MPRs are just too excessive, especially
in downtown areas, being welfare decreasing. While in this paper we do not examine the full social
welfare net cost of MPRs, our estimates of (12) and (15) can shed light on whether MPRs costs
are likely to outweigh the policy congestion benefits (as any reduction in street congestion and in
density levels would also affect property prices and therefore the marginal value of parking).

2.3. In-Lieu Parking Fees
Another way to examine the developers' cost of complying with parking requirements is to
examine the value of in-lieu parking fees. Some cities provide developers with the option of paying
a fee as an alternative to providing the parking required by the development code or ordinance.
The intent is to give developers greater flexibility with regard to providing parking, particularly in
areas where providing on-site parking would be unfeasible due to cost or site characteristics. The
revenues from the in-lieu fee typically contribute to funding new parking facilities or other area
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improvements. This fee might be required up-front or financed over a period of time. Developers
usually have also the option to opt-in to an in-lieu parking program with all of their parking
requirements or just a portion of the required spaces. What a developer pays is related to the
number of spaces involved and the construction, operations, and maintenance cost of shared
parking facilities. The city can use an appraisal process that sets the fee on a case-by-case basis,
or, what is more commonly done is that a flat fee per space is set for all participants in the in-lieu
parking program. Additionally, cities can also set a fee that is lower than the actual cost of
constructing an on-site parking space to incentivize participation into the program. Regardless of
how the fee is set, it must maintain a rational nexus with the parking provision requirement.
To understand the relationship between an in-lieu parking fee and our measure of the shadow
cost of parking requirements, note that in-lieu parking fees are usually levied per required parking
space not provided, while MPRs set parking spaces in proportion to building area. But our shadow
cost measure (12) reveals the net cost of an additional mandated parking space. Therefore, the
value of an in-lieu parking fee also reveals the implicit tax in the MPR. For the sake of space, let´s
focus on the case of a CBD developer.
Let 𝑓 denote the in-lieu fee levied per required parking space not provided in office buildings
in the CBD. Therefore, the in-lieu fee per square foot of building area is given by
𝑓∗𝑎

(16)

since 0  a  1 represents the number of required parking spaces per square feet of gross building
floor space. Three notes are now in order. First, both (12) and (16) represent an implicit tax in the
parking requirements and can be used to understand the private costs of complying with this land
use regulation. Second, the implicit tax associated with (16) resembles an impact fee which
depends both on the values of the in-lieu fee and of the MPRs set for the land use in the analysis.
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This suggests that cities with similar in-lieu fees may have different implicit parking taxes if their
MPRs differ. In particular, we expect that cities with high MPRs for the same land use also exhibit
high values for (16). Third, since impact fees are calculated based on the cost of supplying a public
parking space, our shadow cost measure (12) should have a ceiling equal to (16). That is, we expect
that 𝜆 ≤ 𝑓. To understand such ceiling note that
𝜕𝐾(𝑁 ,𝑆)
𝜕𝐾(𝑁 ,𝑆)
𝜕𝐵(𝑁 ,𝐴)
𝑝𝑘 (𝐾̄ + 𝜕𝑁𝑢 ) = 𝑓 > 𝑝𝑘 (𝐾̄ + 𝜕𝑁𝑢 ) − 𝜕𝑁𝑢 ℎ(𝑆) = 𝜆 > 0.
𝑢

𝑢

𝑢

(17)

In-lieu fees can also be used to measure the complying costs of other land use regulations. If
a developer is willing to pay the in-lieu fee to forgo complying with the regulation then this
suggests that compliance reduces more the value of the development project than the in-lieu fee
paid. One other regulatory example where in-lieu fees can be used to proxy for the private cost of
the regulation is inclusionary zoning. All inclusionary zoning programs require developers to
allocate a specific proportion of their development activity to affordable housing. For mandatory
programs, it is also common that developers have the alternative of paying a one-time fee rather
than complying with the program.
One other interesting result from our theoretical analysis, is that MPRs impact building
density (see (13) for example). As a result, MPRs can reinforce existing density distortions where
density ceilings are also binding. In the case of inclusionary zoning, it is not uncommon to allow
developers to build above the maximum density as an incentive for developers to participate in the
inclusionary housing program. However, in the case of MPRs in order for such a similar incentive
to work it is necessary that the additional net profit of the bonus density would outweigh the
negative net profit of complying with the required number of parking spaces. While the case where
both FAR and MPRs are binding constraints is worth investigating, it is beyond the scope of this
paper and is left for future work.
16

3. Empirical Strategy
Our goal in the empirical section of the paper is to estimate the components of shadow cost of
MPRs on the RHS of equations (12) and (15) for our sample of office properties. We calculate,
using the estimated parameters from hedonic regressions, the marginal values of land and parking.
We use five different specifications of OLS and Mixed Geographically Weighted Regression
(MGWR) estimators. Both approaches allow us to estimate geographic distributions of the
coefficients. We also estimate locally-specific costs for structured parking as well as surface
parking construction, the details can be found in Franco (2016). Finally, with these values, we can
then calculate the distribution of the MPR wedge in (12) and (15).

3.1. Geographic Distribution of Coefficients.
Both OLS and MGWR can obtain a geographic distribution of coefficients. In our case, we
are interested in obtaining estimates of marginal parking and land values that are specific to a
property. Real estate price models typically use the natural log of price as the dependent variables,
a simplified form is

ln( pi ) = a + xi ' b

(16)

where xi is a vector of property attributes. One possible strategy for unobserved attributes is to
include fixed effects and control for as many area attributes as possible in the OLS regressions,
resulting in an equation such as:
𝐥𝐧(𝒑𝒊 ) = 𝜶 + 𝒙′𝒊 𝜷 + 𝒛′𝒊 𝜸 + 𝒇𝒊

(17)

where 𝒛𝒊 are attributes of the local area such as infrastructure, distance to nearest CBD, zoning,
and local land value and fi are geographic fixed effects.
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Geographic fixed effects (or interactions variables with geographic fixed effects) assume sharp
boundaries that must be imposed on the data and constant coefficients within the geographic areas.
Redfearn (2009) finds that this fixed effects strategy can still result in biased coefficients because
residential micro-markets don’t correspond to city or zip code boundaries. Though coefficients
may be correct on average for a geographic area, they are unlikely to be correct at the individual
property level. This is a particular problem for our application, because we require accurate
estimates of marginal values for each individual property in order to estimate the distribution of
MPR costs.

In addition, fixed-effect interaction strategies require the estimation of more

parameters than MGWR (McMillen and Redfearn 2007.) For robustness, however, we examine
fixed effects specification for both OLS and MGWR estimators.
Redfearn (2009) and McMillen and Redfearn (2010) show that GWR is a nonparametric
approach that can reveal coefficient distributions and nests the global OLS approach. This is an
appealing approach because it does not require that we control for all important area attributes or
impose geographic structure in order to correctly estimate the marginal values of land and parking.
Past econometric research shows that GWR methods can capture complex, irregular, spatial effects
for residential properties (McConnell and Redfearn 2010). To our knowledge, GWR has not been
employed with non-residential properties. It seems likely that spatial influences would be as
complex in non-residential property markets as they have been found to be in residential property
markets.
In non-residential markets sales are geographically sparse enough that even GWR estimates
might contain some variation in local area attributes. We use Mixed GWR (MGWR), which allows
certain (mainly local area) parameters to remain fixed as in ordinary least squares (OLS) and others
to vary spatially (mainly property attributes) as in GWR. In the MGWR framework, a total of 𝒌𝜶
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global parameters 𝜸 are estimated in the manner of OLS. A total of 𝒌𝜷 local parameters 𝜷𝒊𝒎 are
estimated at each geographic point (𝒖𝒊 , 𝒗𝒊 ) for each observation 𝒊 (Fotheringham et al. 2002):
𝐥𝐧(𝒑𝒊 ) = 𝜶𝒊 + 𝒙′𝒊 𝜷𝒊 + 𝒛′𝒊 𝜸.

(18)

In the MGWR framework, the estimates for 𝛽𝑖 at each point are obtained using a weighted
least squares (WLS) regression in which the point itself receives the most weight, and points farther
away receive less weight. At each specific point (𝑢𝐼 , 𝑣𝐼 ) with weight 𝑤𝑖 calculated for each point
𝑖 and center observation 𝐼 receiving full weight, the local WLS coefficients are determined by a
weighted regression:

b̂i = ( X 'Wi X )

-1

( X 'WiYi ) .

(19)

We use the bi-square function with k nearest neighbors as a spatial weighting function to
determine the decay in weights 𝑤𝑖 with distance (bi-square is recommended by Fotheringham et
al. 2002.) The number of nearest neighbors is determined by maximizing the CV score using leave
one out cross validation.

3.2 Econometrics Strategy for Omitted Variables.
The key concern in the paper is that omitted variables will bias the key coefficients. In
particular, omitted variables could be correlated with the amount of parking on the property.
Traditional approaches such as instrumental variables or regression discontinuity approaches are
difficult with this data12. Bajari (2012) uses repeat-sales data to use the deviation from the predicted
value of a past sale to condition for omitted variable bias. His key assumption is that buyers have
rational expectations and that omitted property characteristics follow a Markov process. Bajari

12

Bajari (2012) details why quasi-experimental approaches are difficult with property data. Later, in Section 8, we
identify and estimate an IV strategy for a portion of the data for which historical parking requirements provide a
plausible IV.
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uses this to show that under rational expectations, conditional on past price information,
innovations in the value of an omitted attribute are exogenous and previous prices can be used to
control for omitted attributes. Linn (2013) uses a variation of this method for non-repeat sales data.
He uses interactions of time period fixed-effects with pre-sample grid-square level median sales
prices to account for omitted-variable bias at the grid-square level. This method assumes that
omitted variables are correlated with neighborhood attributes, which in turn are captured in local
area sale prices. Linn (2013) has enough repeat sales to be able to compare his approach to the
Bajari (2012) estimator and he finds that the Bajari (2012) estimator yields similar estimates as a
fixed effects version of the Linn (2013) estimator.
Hitaj et al. (2018) uses the Linn (2013) approach to estimate the association of air quality with
the price of apartment buildings in Los Angeles. This is the same geographic area and similar
market as our set of office buildings. They compare IV, first-difference (for repeat sales only),
OLS, and the Linn (2013) version of Bajari’ (2012) method. They find all methods produce
comparable results. In an interesting experiment, they show that the rational-expectations method
is robust to leaving out some important neighborhood attributes. This indicates that for a similar
application as ours to the Linn (2013) method produces satisfactory results.
We use a similar method to Linn (2013) by using pre-period median house prices in the zip
code of the property interacted with our quadratic year trend, and estimate the coefficients locally
in our MGWR specifications.13 The Linn (2013) assumes the geographic level of omitted attributes
by taking the average grid-square price and, because it is not a GWR estimator, assumes the same
coefficient across properties. In-contrast, the relevant price area for our MGWR specification is
endogenously determined through cross-validation. In addition, each property has its own local

13

House sales are much denser than office sales and therefore provide more local information.
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estimated quadratic time-trend coefficients as well as interaction of this trend with pre-period
average prices. In this way it is midway between the original Bajari (2012) method and Linn
(2013).14
In addition, we control for median house prices in the zip code in which the property is located
and the quarter in which the property is sold. Our approach does not eliminate all possible omitted
attributes, but it does narrow the universe of omissions down to ones that are property-specific and
uncorrelated with nearby office prices, house prices, property value assessments, pre-period prices,
and our other local area controls and are not captured by our extensive list of property-level
characteristics.

3.3 Model Selection
Theory suggests that locational attributes should be capitalized into the value of the real estate
property, meaning the marginal value of various property attributes (Rosen 1974, Sheppard 1999).
This suggests that a MGWR approach with a sufficiently small bandwidth should be able to capture
this capitalization using property attributes alone. However, the sparseness of the actual data imply
that locational attributes could vary across even small bandwidths. We first use a small set of
controls for local density, nearby assessed land value, and local parking availability to control for
this possible variation in location attributes. We also run models with a set of additional local
characteristics that are likely to vary longer distances than our local property characteristics. These
include: distance to freeways, ocean distance, crime, and zoning.

Finally, we include

specifications with location fixed effects. These specifications use several in and out-of-sample

14

Linn (2013) also employs the Bajari (2012) repeat-sales methodology. We only see a few repeat sales in our data
(we drop one of the repeats) so we cannot use the full methodology.
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criteria to examine whether a sufficiently rich OLS model can perform as well as or better than a
GWR model.

4. Data and Variables
4.1. Data Sets
Our questions require data on property characteristics, parking construction costs, parking
requirements, building zoning requirements, and location characteristics. Table 1 contains
summary statistics for the key variables for the GWR and OLS specifications. Property data on
office sales from 1997 through 2005 over most of Los Angeles County was obtained through
Costar Group, a national commercial real estate information provider (www.costar.com). The
database contains the sales price of each property and a vector of structural characteristics (such
as building area, land area, and the number of parking spaces) and a vector of location
characteristics (such as zip code, geographic zone, latitude, and longitude).
In our data, we have the number of parking spaces but not the area of parking. To put our
parking space measure in the same units (square feet) as our other property area characteristics,
we use an estimate of 350 sqft/parking space from a local parking expert (personal communication,
Willson, 4/06/06), which includes all lanes, medians, etc., that accompany spaces.15
The marginal cost of parking construction is determined by the type of parking at a site. To
determine the type of parking (surface structural, semi-underground or underground) provided
with each non-residential property we also developed an algorithm that would identify surface
parking. We obtain a 100% accuracy for what the algorithm classifies as surface parking, with

15

The data does not allow us to test whether it is parking area or the number of parking spaces that is valued by the
market. The linear transformation does not relax this constraint. By transforming the parking space variables, the
regressions are using units of 1/350th of a parking space, which is approximately equal to one square foot.
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surface parking representing approximately 64% of the entire dataset. The remaining 36% of
parking which cannot be accurately classified by the algorithm was done manually using Google
Earth and Google Street View.16 In our dataset we have a total of 323,007 parking spaces with the
following distribution: 0.6% are underground mostly found in office properties and some in retail
properties, 94% are surface, 4.7% are semi-structural mostly found in office properties and 0.7%
are multi-structural also mostly found in office properties.
Unit construction costs for a particular type of parking (above or below grade parking) in
different locations of the county was estimated using standard industry practices and published
sources for local construction costs such as the construction cost estimates for parking garages
published by RS Means. Historical cost indexes published by RS Means was also used to move
construction costs forward or backward in time. Further details on parking construction costs are
provided in Franco (2016).

4.2. Property and Location Variables.
Structural characteristics
The primary continuous property characteristics of interest are the total property land area
(pcsqft), the parking area (park), and the total building floor area (bldg). Total building floor area
is the sum of the floor area of all floors in the building. Property age (age) is also included as a
structural control following from the hedonic model. All continuous property characteristics are
log transformed. This follows the past hedonic literature and Cutter and DeWoody’s (2010) finding
that the log specification was superior for a comparable dataset. A series of binary variables for
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Full details on the algorithm developed for the classification of different types of parking for non-residential
properties in the Los Angeles metro region and on the accuracy assessment results can be obtained upon request from
the authors.
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structural property characteristics are also included. These controls include corner location (cnloc),
a set indicating building condition, a set indicating building material, and 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 and 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠
indicating low-rise and office-residential configurations for office properties, and the number of
floors.

Location characteristics
In order to control for location characteristics, we include a large set of location controls as
robustness checks in some specifications. Building density (dens) is related to our key questions
on the incidence of MPR cost. It is defined as building area square footage per total land square
footage within 1/3 mile radius. The density of publicly available parking within 1/3 mile (an
approximation for walking distance) is controlled for via two variables (pkgarg for garages, pksup
for other supplemental parking) defined as parking area square footage per total land square
footage. ZIP code median house price at the time of sale of the non-residential property
(DQhouseprice) and total assessed land value for non-residential properties within 1/3 mile radius
(landval, logged) control for underlying land value to isolate the more-relevant property value.
We also include a selection of variables for amenities These included distance to the ocean
(quadratic), distance to the nearest freeway (quadratic), four principal components derived from
distances to various centers including but not limited to the CBD (Los Angeles is classified as a
polycentric city (Sivitanidou 1996)), and the first of two principal components for weather
variables. Additionally, a neighborhood crime rate index for the year 2000 (𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒) was included
as a locally varying estimate in MGWR. Finally, we control for the type of zoning in which the
office is located.
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5. Estimation and Results
In this section we examine OLS and mixed GWR (MGWR) estimates for different sets of
variables and with and without fixed effects (see Table 2 for the list of variables). We compare
the MGWR and OLS specifications on information criteria and LOOCV. Finally, we compare the
OLS and MGWR results for the key coefficients to examine whether the results show spatial
variability of coefficients.

5.1 Mixed GWR Choices
The MGWR model allows us to set some coefficients as global and others as locally estimated.
This is necessary because many of the locational variables do not vary over our typical bandwidths.
For example, distance to the ocean will vary little within a small number of nearest neighbors. A
geographic fixed effect will not vary at all. Table 2 shows which coefficients are global and which
ones are local. We attempted to estimate every variable local up to the limitations of the data. In
all cases the key structural coefficients (log of building, land, and parking area, and the interaction
of the log of building and parking area) are estimated locally. We also found we could estimate
local coefficients for a quadratic in the year of sale that results in a good approximation to yearly
fixed effects (year fixed effects were too collinear for MGWR estimation in some specifications).

5.2 Comparison of OLS and MGWR Estimation.
We estimate a range of specifications and compare OLS and MGWR in order to test for
robustness. The specifications in Table 3 start from the very basic building characteristics (size of
parcel and building amount of parking and age) in column 1 through the most complete set of
controls in column 10.
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The variability of the coefficients, an F-test of residuals, and Moran’s I calculations (Table 3)
all reject the null hypothesis of zero geographic coefficient variability. Table 4 shows that an Ftest for spatial variability rejects the null of spatial variability for each key coefficient at any
conventional significance level. An additional MGWR Anova test rejects the null of the global
model as a whole at any conventional significance level. The Moran I results (Table 3) also indicate
the MGWR significantly reduces spatial autocorrelation in the residuals relative to OLS for all
property types.
Specification 3-5 perform similarly on AICc, BIC, and CV measures. 17 Specification five uses
the MGWR version of the Linn (2013) rational-expectations estimator. Specification one (with
only property-level controls) performs by far the worst. We use specification five for the marginal
value calculation as it should control for unobserved attributes better than the other specifications
and is only slightly worse on the out-of-sample criteria
Table 4 shows the key coefficients for the marginal values calculations in the next section for
specification five. The OLS and the mean MGWR coefficients are similar. The key difference is
the local variability in the coefficients of the MGWR estimator. This indicates that marginal values
of property area and parking will vary substantially more in the MGWR estimator across local
areas.

6. Shadow Cost of Parking Minimums
We now turn to the central questions of this paper. First, we discuss how large the MPR wedge
would have to be to be economically significant. Then, we use the specifications from the OLS

17

All fixed effect specifications performed poorly relative to their equivalent specifications-especially with regard to
their CV score. Their Moran’s I coefficients are also substantially higher. This indicates that the official borders do a
poor job of capturing real estate submarkets. We don’t present any of the FE results because of this poor performance.
This finding also indicates that fixed effects interacted with attributes would also perform quite poorly.
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and MGWR runs to calculate the MPR marginal cost wedge and its components from the
specification coefficient estimates. Next, we calculate the distribution of MPR costs to determine
the percent of properties that are likely to have economically significant MPR wedges. Finally, we
examine whether there is a significant gradient in MPR size in building density, land value, and
building size.

6.1 When are MPR Costs Likely to Matter?
How large do MPR costs have to be to plausibly affect building decisions or overall
development costs? Offices in this period had a typical building construction cost of $150 per
square foot.18 A 10% addition to these costs would be a significant cost to the builder. What MPR
cost would add 10% or $15 increase to these costs? A typical office property has an MPR of one
space per 500 ft.² of building area and each parking spot takes up 350 ft.² That implies every foot
of building space is mandated to have .7 feet of parking (=350 ft.²/ 500 ft.²). At this ratio, a $22/
ft.² MPR cost would add about $15 in net parking cost to the per foot cost of construction
(remember the MPR cost is the net loss). This corresponds to the shadow cost  . The market
response to this additional cost depends on the building supply elasticity. The market would then
need to be very inelastic for an MPR this size not to effect supply substantially.

6.2 Comparison of the distribution of marginal values and shadow cost of MPRS.
We calculate the shadow cost of MPRs according to (12) or (15), which is the difference
between the marginal value of parking and the land and capital cost of supplying that parking.19

18

Estimated using R.S. Means for 2006 data. Individual offices may vary.
We calculate the marginal value of land by calculating the predicted price from the specification, then calculating
the predicted price after adding a square foot amount of land. The difference is the marginal value of a square foot of
land. We follow the same procedure to calculate parking and building floor area marginal value.
19
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Table 5 shows that the average MPR cost is $20 per ft2 and above for all MGWR specifications
and OLS specifications 3-5. For these specifications, the average MPR cost implies a wedge that
is about 10% of building construction cost (per ft2). Overall, the MPR costs estimated by MGWR
are higher than OLS but comparable for the specifications with local controls (specifications 35).20
Table 5 also shows that the variance of MPR costs per ft2 is greater in the MGWR models.
Though the mean costs for the OLS specifications 3-5 are not too different from that of the better
MGWR specifications, the spread of costs is much greater from the MGWR model. Figure 1 shows
that the 75th percentile of MPR costs is $37 per ft2 (about 27% of building costs) and $31 per ft2
for OLS. At the 90th percentile the MPR cost is $99 per ft2 for the MGWR estimator. These
estimates suggest that there are very large differences in MPR costs per ft2 across properties. Our
next section explores the MPR cost gradient with respect to local density, local land value, and
building size.

6.3 Is the shadow cost gradient steep enough to affect property location or building decisions?
Recall that there need to be large differences in MPR costs for MPRs to plausibly affect urban
form and support the strong form of the MPR hypothesis. Figures 2-5 map MPR costs and the
components of the costs. From Figure 2 we observe that large portions of the county area have
near zero or negative (non-binding) MPR costs. High MPR costs are nevertheless concentrated in
the high land value corridor from Los Angeles Downtown west to the coast, the Wilshire/Santa

20

OLS with few or no local controls (1 and 2) is a clearly a poor fit as shown by the negative marginal value of land.
This occurs because larger properties are generally located farther from central areas so there is a negative correlation
between land size and price if one does not control for local geographic characteristics. GWR has estimates that are
economically possible and within a small range no matter the set of controls.
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Monica Corridor (Figure 2 and Figure 3), with a few other hot spots.21 The Wilshire/Santa Monica
Corridor is also known as a high amenity zone in the county with trendy retail settlements and
high-culture entertainment. It is also considered as the postmodern central core for the
metropolitan region as it includes the traditional CBD only on its periphery (downtown LA), and
it crosses several municipal boundaries. Inspection between Figures 2 and 3 further reveals that
the MPR cost variation is largely due to land value (Figure 3)-though parking value is also low in
the Wilshire/Santa Monica corridor, perhaps because of the high concentration of commercial
parking garages (Figure 5). Overall, the maps show a large difference in MPR costs per ft2 between
the densest, most valuable areas of Los Angeles and other areas.
We use three different variables to characterize the difference in MPR costs per ft2 between
low and high-density areas. One local density measure is building square footage/per square foot
land within one-third of a mile of the property (density) excluding the own property. We also use
the log of total assessed land value in the same radius (llandval) as an indirect measure of density.
These are interesting tests of the MGWR because they are not in the control variables for all
specifications. Geometric limitations imply MPR costs per ft2 are higher for smaller properties
because a given MPR ratio is more difficult to fit in a small property that needs to consider lanes,
setbacks, etc., so we also examine property size (pcsqft) to be sure property size is not confounding
the density/value gradients.22
Table 6 shows our three specifications to characterize this gradient (variables are all
standardized). The relevant coefficients are jointly and individually significant at the 1% level.
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The Wilshire/Santa Monica corridor occupies a narrow band of space stretching from the Pacific Ocean at Santa
Monica in an arc along the base of the Santa Monica Mountains through West L.A., Brentwood, Westwood, Century
City, Beverly Hills, Fairfax/Melrose, West Hollywood, Hollywood, Silver Lake, Echo Park, Koreatown, and
Westlake, and culminating in Downtown Los Angeles.
22
We tested whether the influence of parcel size was due to our functional form and found that the log-log form clearly
outperforms linear, quadratic, and the quadratic of the log forms (unreported regressions).
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Our density metric shows that a standard deviation density is associated with an approximately
$11 increase in the estimated MPR cost. Therefore, in comparing the average property one standard
deviation above the mean density to one a standard deviation below the mean density a developer
would face about a $23 difference in MPR costs, or about 10% of average building construction
costs. The land value gradient is larger with a $15 increase associated with a standard deviation
extra in (logged) land value. A one standard deviation increase in the size of the parcel is associated
with about an $11 decrease in the MPR. This shows the MPR cost falls particularly hard on smaller
properties in dense and high value areas. Figure 6 illustrates lowness curves for the estimated MPR
cost for top decile and bottom quartile of assessed land values by the size of the property. Both
high and low value properties that estimated MPRs decline with property size.
To get a true sense of these combined effects we can look at a small property in a dense, high
land value area compared to a property on the other side of the spectrum using the estimated
parameters in the fourth column in Table 9. A property exactly at one standard deviation above
the mean in density and value (these are correlated at .8) and one standard deviation below the
mean in land size is predicted to face a $39 MPR cost. A property that is one standard deviation
below the mean in density and value and at the mean in land size is predicted to face a $4 MPR
cost. This estimated differences in MPR costs is about 23% of the construction costs for these high
density/value properties.
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7. Robustness Checks
Market Test
We obtained the parking requirements for offices in each city for a largely overlapping
dataset.23 In this data, the parking requirement largely predicts the number of parking spaces. A
simple regression of parking spaces on the properties’ minimum requirement has a coefficient near
one and an R2 of .68. The median ratio of space to required parking is .97 and 50% of the data has
a ratio between .7 and 1.3. This indicates that developers are seldom installing significantly more
parking than required - which is consistent with binding MPRs. The 50% of properties with
parking less than the MPR suggest that many developers find ways to decrease the burden of
MPRs.

In-Lieu Parking Fee Test
One of these ways to decrease the burden of MPRs is to pay a fee in-lieu of installing required
parking. In lieu fees can be established as a flat rate per parking space not provided or per square
foot of floor area, or through a case-by-case determination for the development as a whole. We
researched in-lieu fees for the thirty largest cities in Los Angeles county and found seven cities
with clearly stated in-lieu fees (all on a parking space basis.)24 The in-lieu fees are set by the cities
in large part based on estimates of the cost of publicly supplying structured parking to replace the
private parking spots.

23

. Some properties with all data necessary for the regression did not have a parking requirement that was clear from
the city code and had to be dropped. These are not building level individual requirements, but rather the general
parking requirement stated in the city code for the zone the office building is located in. These requirements can be
increased or decreased because of zoning variances or other neighborhood factors.
24
Additional cities had in-lieu fees on a case by case basis or there was no clear evidence on the amount of the in-lieu
fee. There may be additional cities with in-lieu fees that our code search did not find. In our search we also found
information for some cities not in the top 30 of population like Claremont. The in-lieu parking regulations are complex
and often are only available for specific circumstances and geographic areas.
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The in-lieu fees (measured per ft2) are in the same range as the MPR costs for those cities (see
Table 7). The higher cost cities such as Santa Monica and Beverly Hills have high in-lieu fees as
well-and for all cities the in-lieu fees are in the same range as the MPR costs for those cities.
According to our model, the MPR cost should also have a ceiling based on the cost of structured
parking. The general correspondence of in-lieu fees with the MPR costs in Table 7 is consistent
with this portion of our theory. The average parking in-lieu fee per ft2 for our sampled cities in
Table 7 is around $57, and our average shadow cost of MPRs is $44 per ft2. MPRs cost estimates
in Table 7 nevertheless still underestimate the cost of complying with MPRs somewhat, as
developers supplying the mandated spaces must also pay property taxes and maintenance costs for
the privately supplied spaces.

Robustness to Regulatory Stringency
A key remaining bias concern is that the parking amount could correlate with regulatory
stringency. That is, a property with a large amount of parking is more likely to have higher parking
requirements and more stringent Floor-Area Ratios or height limits than an otherwise similar
property with less parking. City fixed effects can partially control for regulatory stringency as long
as they are constant within the city. However, zoning requirements can differ within a city. Height
and FAR requirements depend on the zoning designation as well as the city. Parking requirements
can be nonlinear in building square feet. Therefore, the effect of these requirements could be
different for different sized buildings within the same city.
If regulatory stringency is correlated with price (because, for example, price may partially
depend on redevelopment value and that is a function of what the zoning allows to be built) and is
correlated with the amount of parking or other building attributes, then leaving it out of the
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regressions could bias our results. We determined three key zoning requirements (at the date of
sale) for a subset of the data: parking minimum requirements, floor area ratio maximums, and
height limits. Our key variable for parking requirements is the average parking requirement. This
is the number of square feet of parking required per building square feet (assuming 350 squarefoot per parking space). The maximum height variable is in feet. The FAR variable is allowed
building floor space per square foot of buildable area.25 We then ran specification five for this
subsample with and without these requirements.
We compare two MGWR specifications in Table 8. The first column presents results for the
key coefficients for specification 5 and the subsample for which we were able to obtain the three
requirements. The results are very similar to the full sample results in column two of Table 7. The
second column uses the same subsample as column one, and uses specification five but with FAR,
height, and parking controls. The size and the standard deviation of the (locally-estimated)
coefficients is almost identical. The results suggest that the average parking requirement is
significantly associated with property value but including these controls does not affect our main
coefficients. We leave this interesting result for exploration in future research.

Using Historical Parking Requirements as an Instrumental Variable.
Another possibility for a bias concern is that our results on the low marginal parking value
could be due to builders building more parking on relatively low value parcels, and that low value
is not accounted for by any of our other empirical strategies (spatially-varying fixed effects,

25

For all cities except Los Angeles data we matched the location of properties to GIS maps of the zones within each
city. Then we researched the general FAR and height limits and parking requirements for each zone. Some cities such
as Burbank have more complex zoning overlays where zoning requirements can only be found property by property
so these were dropped from the analysis. Los Angeles City has a complex zoning system but has an excellent property
database (zimas.org) where we could individually match the property to it zoning and height and far requirements.
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assessed land value control, other area controls, and the Linn (2013) estimator). For Los Angeles
City there is good historical data on parking requirements for offices back to the inception of
parking requirements in 1946. We use a strategy similar to 2SLS. The key identification claim
is that this parking requirement is exogenous and unrelated to unobserved components of current
underlying land value. This claim is plausible because within Los Angeles city the requirements
for offices differ over time, but not area26 (except for the Downtown parking district which began
in 1968). Also, the redevelopment value effect of the parking requirements discussed on the
previous section would be based on current rather than historical requirements- and these have
changed for a majority (about 81%) of the properties. We estimate a first stage model that predicts
the amount of parking based on the parking requirement, the building size, and the property size.
We then replace the parking amount with this estimated parking amount.27 We then use these
estimated variables in specification two (the number of observations is much lower and therefore
we use a specification with fewer variables.) Table 9 compares the OLS results using this pseudoinstrumental variables strategy compared to the original variables on the Los Angeles City subsample. The MPR cost, as well as the marginal building, parking, and land value are quite similar
between the two.

8. Conclusions
Our theoretical model suggests that MPRs should bind more in dense areas where the value of
land is high. In these areas, the marginal value of parking would tend to be less than the cost of
land and/or parking construction cost. Even if non-residential property owners can build above or

26

Since the late 1990s, Los Angeles City has increasingly gone to neighborhood specific parking requirements, but
these are not applicable to our sample, which was built before these requirements went into effect.
27
The actual variables in the specification are the log of parking area and the interaction of this variable with the log
of building area. These non-linearities make the approach somewhat different than normal 2SLS estimation.
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below structured parking, the high cost of such type of parking would tend to result in more binding
MPRS. These theoretical insights can best be tested with an estimator that allows the parameters
of the hedonic model to vary spatially. The MGWR model estimates property-specific coefficients
that allows us to test our theoretical predictions.
We apply the MGWR model to data from Los Angeles non-residential property sales. We find
that the MGWR model is significantly better than OLS in its out-of-sample prediction (CV score)
and AICc. Then, we use the MGWR model parameters to estimate whether the marginal value of
parking is less than the construction and/or land costs of providing that parking (shadow cost of
MPRs). Both OLS and MGWR specifications indicate that a large proportion of properties have
MPR shadow costs that are large enough to plausible effect building decisions.
Next, we determined in which circumstances MPRs tend to bind. Unsurprisingly, we find that
in the high land value areas such as CBDs and coastal areas the evidence is consistent with more
binding MPRs. Also, the evidence is consistent with smaller plots having more binding MPRs.
These smaller plots tend to be in more-densely-built areas. The MGWR runs indicate that a
majority of properties have substantial MPR shadow costs. A real-world market test and several
robustness checks suggest that our methods produce accurate measures of the MPR cost-gradient.
Our methods could be used to estimate the cost gradient for many different zoning and building
regulations such as height, floor-area ratio, setbacks, and open space requirements. These costgradients may will influence urban density and form, which are key elements for the productivity
of regions and countries as whole (Gilles, Duranton and Puga 2020).
We find a strong density and assessed land value gradient in our MPR costs estimates. The
MGWR approach proved its efficacy at incorporating unobserved local influences into its
estimates. The differences between dense, high value areas and others is large enough to decrease
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building in the dense/high value areas central areas relative to more sprawling outskirts if supply
is at all elastic. Our findings support the strong view of Shoup and others that parking minimums
could affect City form by imposing greater costs on older, denser, more valuable areas than lower
land value, sprawling, areas.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary statistics for key variables used in the GWR model and/or the construction
cost estimates.
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std.Dev.
Min
Max
Lot size (sqft)

2571

21994.531

22962.869

932.184

146797.188

Parking area (sqft)

2571

11275.039

14274.666

300.000

111300.000

Building floor area
(sqft)

2571

13262.680

14595.052

1076.000

98728.000

Property Year Built
(years)

2571

1963.890

19.758

1888.000

2006.000
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Table 2: List of Variables by Global and Local
Local Variables
Lot size (sqft)
Parking area (sqft)
Building floor area (sqft)
Property Year Built (years)
Year of Sale-1996
(Year of Sale-1996)2
Pre-Period Average of median sales
price

Global Variables
Construction

Condition

Brick
Frame
Mixed
Other
Excellent
Good
Average

Pre-Period median sale price growth

Fair
Zoning

Local Area
Controls

Poor
Downtown
Residential
Mixed
Office
Industrial
Commercial
ZIP code median house price (US$)
Total assessed land value within 1/3
mile
Supplemental parking area within 1/3
mile
Parking garage area within 1/3 mile
Building density within 1/3 mi le
Distance to ocean (mi)
Distance to nearest freeway (mi)
Crime Index in year 2000
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Table 3: Measures of Fit for OLS and GWR
Specification
Estimator
AICc:
BIC/MDL:
CV:
Adjusted R square:
Bandwidth:
Moran's I**
Control Variables:
Local (for GWR)
Basic Building
Pre-Period
Controls*
Global (GWR and OLS)
Extended Building
Basic Geographic
Zoning
Amenities

I
OLS
3,122

II
GWR

1,339

3,222
4,132
0.197
0.098
0.756
0.901
2571
95
0.207
0.018

OLS
2,334

III
GWR

1,288

2,480 4,025
0.145
0.096
0.821
0.902
2571
100
0.117
0.014

OLS
1,641

IV
GWR

1,256

1,868 2,589
0.111
0.096
0.864
0.890
2571
242
0.065
0.034

OLS
1,656

V
GWR

1,268

1,854
2,546
0.112
0.096
0.863
0.889
2571
248
0.067
0.035

OLS
1,618

GWR
1,287

1,857

2,684
0.110
0.865
2571
0.066

0.097
0.889
271
0.032

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N
N
N
N

N
N
N
N

Y
Y
N
N

Y
Y
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
N
Y

Y
Y
N
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

* Pre-Period house price level and trend variables.
** All results significant at the 1% level, one tailed test.
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Table 4: Coefficient Estimates for Principle Specification

Specification V

Key Variables
Intercept
ln(Lot ft2)
ln(parking ft2)
ln(building ft2)
ln(parking)*ln(building)
ln(age)
Sale year-1997
(Sale year-1997)^2
Pre-period price*Sale year-1997
Pre-period price*(Sale year-1997)^2

Test of Spatial
OLS
GWR
Variability (GWR)
Coefficient Coefficient Estimates F-Statistic p-level
Mean#
SD*
13.88
0.19
-0.55
-0.14
1.14
-0.07
-0.10
0.43
0.25
-0.29

13.88
0.19
-0.63
-0.24
1.34
-0.07
-0.12
0.43
0.28
-0.28

Local (for GWR)
Basic Building
Y
Pre-Period Controls*
Y
Global (GWR and OLS)
Extended Building
Y
Basic Geographic
Y
Zoning
Y
Amenities
Y
* This is the standard deviation of the vector of coefficient estimates
produced
for each variable by the GWR estimates.
** These are the variables for pre-period housing price level and
growtrh.
# These are locally estimated so the individual estimates only can be
evaluated for statistical significance.
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Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

0.19
0.07
0.35
0.40
0.72
0.04
0.30
0.34
0.40
0.44

8.4
13.0
13.6
10.7
30.2
13.2
13.4
13.7
14.5
23.6

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Table 5: Marginal Values
Specification MPR Cost
($)
GWR
Mean
1
20
2
24
3
25
4
23
5
26
OLS
Mean
1
-5
2
11
3
24
4
22
5
25

SD
55
54
39
39
38
SD
31
31
33
33
32

Parking Value
($)
Mean
18
16
16
17
15
Mean
18
15
16
17
16

Table 6: Density Gradient Regression results
(1)

Dependent Variable
Property Area ftsup:2*

MPR_Cost
$/ft2
-11.571***
(0.713)

Built Area Density (1/3
mile)*

SD
36
34
24
25
23
SD
28
30
27
28
26

(2)

Land Value
($)
Mean
18
21
21
21
22
Mean
-7
7
21
20
21

(3)

(0.723)

Obs.
R-squared
N aic bic

26.123***
(0.713)
2571
0.093
25747.158

(4)

MPR_Cost MPR_Cost MPR_Cost
$/ft2
$/ft2
$/ft2
10.983***
(0.682)
9.934***
4.339***

Land Value (1/3 mile)*
Constant

SD
26
28
22
21
22
SD
6
8
19
19
19

26.123***
(0.723)
2571
0.068
25815.487

Standard errors are in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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11.590***
(0.741)
11.501***
(1.177)
2571
0.087
25763.804

(0.972)
7.664***
(1.008)
16.454***
(1.442)
2571
0.176
25505.201

Table 7: In lieu Fees Are in the Same Range as Estimated MPR Costs.
City
Carson
Inglewood
Walnut
Claremont
Glendale

In-Lieu
Fee/space

Fee/Ft2

$ 7,000

$ 20.00

$ 4.77

12

$ 3,000

$8.57

$ 13.01

38

$ 26,537

$75.82

$14.11

2

$ 9,000

$25.71

$ 28.13

12

$ 24,000

$68.57

$ 41.98

115

City MPR Cost mean /Ft2 Obs

Beverly Hills

61
Rodeo Drive
Beverly
Other CBD

Santa Monica

$ 35,704

$102.01

$ 72.92

$ 28,653

$ 81.87

$ 72.92

$ 21,422

$61.21

$72.92

$ 20,000

$57.14

$ 77.26
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Table 8: Robustness To Building Requirements (Specification V GWR Results).

Intercept
lpcsqft
logpark
logbldg
logparkxlogbldg
lage
yearssince1997
yearssince1997sq
dqprgrowth
dqavprice
Local (for GWR)
Basic Building
Pre-Period Controls**

mean#
13.877
0.202
-0.597
-0.200
1.244
-0.084
0.101
0.214
-0.004
0.076

S.d. of Estimates*
0.170
0.067
0.329
0.369
0.676
0.040
0.107
0.113
0.083
0.062

Y
Y

mean#
13.878
0.202
-0.596
-0.201
1.243
-0.087
0.102
0.213
-0.004
0.076

S.d. of Estimates*
0.168
0.066
0.327
0.365
0.671
0.039
0.107
0.114
0.082
0.061

Y
Y

Global (GWR and OLS)
Property Regulation***
Extended Building
Basic Geographic
Zoning
Amenities

N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
* This is the standard deviation of the vector of coefficient estimates produced for each variable by the GWR estimates.
** These are the variables for pre-period housing price level and growtrh.
*** Requirements for maximum floor area ratio, minimum parking, and maximum height/FAR.
# These are locally estimated so the individual estimates only can be evaluated for statistical significance.
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Table 9: Marginal Values from Pseudo IV Approach
Specification MPR Cost
Parking
OLS
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
IV
43
467
0
467
IV Sample
27
37
16
30
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Land
Mean
20
19

SD
15
14

Figure 1: Estimated Percentiles for MPR Cost.
(specification V)
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Figure 2: Marginal Cost of Minimum Parking Requirements
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Figure 3: Marginal Value of Land
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Figure 4: Marginal Value of Parking
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Figure 5: Location of Paid Parking.
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Figure 6: Minimum Parking Regulation Cost: Lowess Curves by Land Value and Property Size
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